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AL NAJJAR V. RENO
97 F. Supp. 2D 1329 (S.D. FLA. 2000)
Mazen Al Najjar , the petitioner, a forty-three year old Palestinian,
originally entered the United States in 1981 as a non-immigrant graduate
student.' His last entry into the U.S. was in 1984 for the completion of his
non-immigrant graduate student status.2 In 1985, Al Najjar's first wife filed
a petition with the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to have his
immigration status adjusted.3 The INS denied the petition.4 Subsequently, the
INS issued an order alleging that the petitioner was deportable under §
241 (a)(9) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act5 ("INA"), on the grounds
that he had overstayed his nonimmigrant student visa.6 In connection with the
violation, the INS gave notice to Al Najjar that his deportation hearing was set
for June 4, 1986 and also filed a warrant for his arrest.7 When Al Najjar failed
to appear for his hearing, the Immigration Judge ("IJ") closed his case.' The
petitioner, however, claimed that he did not receive notice of the deportation
hearing until June 6, 1986. 9 He subsequently filed to have his case reopened
but the INS did not respond.'
In 1993, the World of Islam Studies Enterprise ("WISE"), an organization
affiliated with the University of South Florida, requested a change of
petitioner's status as an alien worker." Given that Al Najjar was the CEO of
this non-profit organization, for which he received a yearly salary of $32,000,
the INS reclassified petitioner as "a member of professions with advanced
degree or of exceptional ability."'
' 2
Nearly ten years after Al Najjar filed to reopen his case, the INS
rescheduled his deportation hearing for February 8, 1996 based on his
violation of INA § 241(a)(9). 3 Al Najjar conceded his deportability as
charged under section § 241 (a)(9) but argued for discretionary relief seeking
suspension of deportation, including asylum and withholding or removal. "
The IJ denied his motions and found him deportable. 5 Al Najjar subsequently
1. Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
2. AlNajar, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
3. Id..
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appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 16
While awaiting his appeal, the petitioner was taken into custody by the
INS and detained without bond. 17 When Al Najjar requested redetermination
of his bond status based on 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(d), 8 he was informed that the INS
would provide classified evidence in camera to support its custody
determination. 9 The petitioner was told that WISE was known to support
Palestinian Islamic Jihad ("PIJ") and that he was to be held without bond
based on his relationship to WISE.2°
In an exparte in camera hearing, the INS presented classified information
to the IJ regarding Al Najjar's association with the PIJ.2' Neither the petitioner
nor his counsel were permitted to attend the private hearing before the IJ and
no record of the in camera proceeding was made.22 Al Najjar was allowed to
introduce evidence to rebut testimony given during the public portions of the
hearing, which included an unclassified summary of the classified
information.23 Nevertheless, the IJ found that the classified information was
determinative and that Al Najjar posed a threat to national security.24 Thus,
the IJ concluded that the petitioner could continue to be held without bond
based on the classified evidence alleging Al Najjar's affiliation with a known
terrorist organization, evidence not shown to the petitioner or his counsel and,
thus, not subject to confrontation or cross-examination.
2 5
Al Najjar then appealed the bond redetermination decision to the BIA,
which also examined the classified information and reasoned that the
government had a compelling interest in shielding information sensitive to
national security.26 After finding the exparte in camera hearing appropriate,
the BIA found Al Najjar to be a threat to national security and the safety of
other persons or property. 27 The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision and denied
Petitioner's request to be released on bond.28
The deportation hearing of Al Najjar was considered by another panel of
the BIA.29 This panel upheld the deportation decision of the IJ.3" The
16. Id.
17. id.
18. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(d) (1995).











30. Id. at 1335.
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petitioner then filed an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to
review the final order of deportation.3 The Eleventh Circuit denied the
petition to overrule the BIA's final order of deportation.32
Al Najjar filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief with the district court.33 He asked for
immediate release pending the outcome of the deportation proceedings and
challenged his detention on both statutory and constitutional grounds.34 The
petitioner's statutory arguments were that: (1) the INA prohibits his detention
based on evidence he had not had the opportunity to evaluate or confront; and
(2) his continued detention based merely on his "association" with the PIJ was
not authorized by the INA.3 5 He also argued that detention violated his
constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.36
Al Najjar argued that these constitutional violations arose from: (1) the denial
of a meaningful opportunity to defend himself; (2) an inadequate appellate
review due to the IJ's failure to maintain a record of the in camera hearing;
and (3) the IJ's fundamentally unfair reliance on hearsay.37
HOLDING
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held
that: (1) it had jurisdiction over the Petitioner's challenge to the IJ's bond
redetermination decision; 38 (2) Petitioner's procedural due process rights were
violated in the bond redetermination proceeding because of the ex parte in
camera presentation of classified evidence; 39 and (3) Petitioner's mere
association with a known terrorist organization did not constitute a reasonable
foundation under the INA for the conclusion that petitioner was a threat to
31. Id.
32. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001). In upholding the BIA's final order
of deportation, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that: (1) BIA was barred from considering new information on
appeal according to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act; (2) aliens had failed
to demonstrate any well-founded fear of persecution; (3) in the absence of a well-founded fear of
persecution, the petitioner was unable to meet the greater burden of request to withhold removal; (4) no
abuse in determining the country of removal; (5) evidence of continued physical presence is reviewable but
evidence to suspend deportation is a discretionary matter and is barred from review; (6) petitioner's
continuous physical presence clock stopped when he was served with and ordered to show cause upon the
commencement of his removal proceeding; and (7) petitioner could not establish enough likelihood of
torture to warrant relief.





38. Id. at 1342.
39. Id. at 1356.
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national security in order to justify detaining him without bond.4"
ANALYSIS
Before addressing Al Najjar's substantive claims, the court first decided
whether it had jurisdiction over the claims.4 The district court exerted
jurisdiction on two grounds.42 First, the court noted that 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 4
allowed an alien to challenge INS action through a petition for habeas
corpus." However, this challenge is only possible so long as the action is not
a final order of deportation. 5 Second, the bifurcation of the deportation and
bond hearings meant that the bond hearing was distinct from the deportation
hearing.46 Since, the bond determination was separate from the deportation
hearing,47 § 106(a)48 of the INA, governing the exclusiveness of procedures,
did not apply and therefore the court had jurisdiction over a habeas corpus
petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241. 4
With jurisdiction established, the court proceeded to consider Al Najjar's
substantive claims."0 The court considered the statutory and constitutional
claims raised by the IJ's actions separately.5 Primarily, the court restricted its
analysis to determining if there was statutory or constitutional authority for the
IJ to introduce and rely on classified information in petitioner's bond
40. Id. at 1361-1362.
41. Id. at 1336.
42. Id.
43. (a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme court, any justice thereof, the district
courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be
entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had. 28
U.S.C.A. § 2241 (1994).
44. Al Najjar at 1336.
45. Id. at 1337.
46. Id.
47. Al Najyar, 257 F.3d at 1304. See also supra note 30.
48. Exclusiveness of procedure:
The procedure prescribed by, and all the provisions of chapter 158 of Title 28, shall be the sole
and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deportation heretofore or
hereafter made against aliens within the United States pursuant to administrative proceedings
under section 242(b)[8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(b)] or comparable provision or any prior Act, except
that (1) Time for filing Petition: a petition for review may be filed not later than 90 days after
the date of the issuance of the final deportation order, or, in the case of an alien convicted of an
aggravated felony, not later than 30 days after the issuance of such order (2) Venue: the venue
of any petition for review under this section shall be in the judicial circuit in which the
administrative proceedings before a special inquiry officer were conducted in whole or in part,
or in the judicial circuit wherein is the residence, as defined in this chapter, of the petitioner, but
not in more than one circuit. INA §106(a).
49. AlNajjar, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
50. Id. at 1345.
51. Id.
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determination hearing and whether Al Najjar's "association" with the PIJ made
him a threat to national security.
52
The court began its analysis by pointing out that the Attorney General's
powers in regards to detaining aliens stem from the INA.53 The INA gives the
Attorney General wide discretion to continue an alien's custody during
deportation proceedings.54 Her decisions can be overridden only if there is no
reasonable foundation for them." Thus, the court noted that aliens bear a
heavy burden in showing that the Attorney General has abused her
discretion.56
While the Attorney General may have wide discretion, she is still
constrained by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which places
limits on the ability of the Executive to detain an alien during the pendency of
his deportation proceeding.57 The court noted that these constitutional rights
apply to Al Najjar because he was a "deportable" alien and not an excludable
alien. Also, given that the petitioner only challenged his continued detention
based on the reliance of classified information, the court restricted its inquiry
to this issue.59
Al Najjar did not dispute the Attorney General's discretion to detain
aliens during deportation proceedings under a properly made finding that they
pose a threat to national security.6" Rather, he only challenged the manner in
which his custody was determined. 6 In particular, he argued that there was no
express or implied statutory justification in the INA for the use of classified
information in a bond redetermination hearing.62 After reviewing the language
of INA § 242, the court agreed with Al Najjar that there was no express
authority for the use of classified information in a bond redetermination
hearing.63





56. Id. at 1343.
57. Id.
58. An excludable alien is one of a class aliens who have been deemed ineligible to receive visas
and are excluded from entering the United States on the basis of legitimate reasons. The classes of
excludable aliens are listed in INA § 212.




63. § 242 of the INA outlines the parameters ofjudicial review of orders of removal. It vests the
IJ and BIA with discretion to review an initial custody decision and to decide if detention should be
continued or if the alien should be released on bond or conditional parole. INA § 242 (2001).
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District Director,64 to determine if there was implied authority in the INA for
the use of classified evidence. 6' The Barbour court had allowed the use of
secret evidence in a bond determination hearing based on regulation 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.2(b)66 which allowed custody to be determined on "any information
available., 67 The Barbour court interpreted this provision to permit the use of
classified information in a bond redetermination hearing.68 This interpretation
proved fatal for Al Najjar because the language of 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.19(d), 69 which covered his bond redetermination proceeding, was similar
to that of the regulation applicable in Barbour."0 This similarity led the court
to conclude that the use of classified information in bond redetermination
proceedings is permissible within the implied authority of the INA.7
The court then considered whether the introduction and use of using
classified information violated Al Najjar's procedural due process rights by:
(1) denying him notice of the charges brought against him and a meaningful
opportunity to defend himself and (2) depriving him of a meaningful appellate
review and the possibility of declassification due to the IJ's failure to keep a
record of the in camera proceedings.72 If the court found such violations, it
would fashion an appropriate remedy under the circumstances.73
The first step in evaluating Al Najjar's procedural due process claims was
to determine if a constitutionally protected liberty interest had been
implicated.74 The court noted that while aliens are entitled to due process
protections, the status and circumstances of the alien impact the extent of those
64. See Barbour v. District Director, 491 F.2d at 573 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that the review of and
reliance on classified information in making bond determination was within the statutory authority granted
by the INA). In Barbour the court considered whether the INA provided statutory authority to use classified
information. Id. at 575. Barbour, who was a deportable alien, was being held in custody without bail when
the Attorney General presented classified information in order to deny his bond redetermination because
he was a threat to national security. Id. The court based its ruling on 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(b), which stated that
custody decision could be based on any information available or presented, even classified information. Id.
at 578.
65. Al Najar, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
66. 8 C.F.R.§ 242.2(b) (1993) states "determination ofthe special inquiry officer as to custody status
or bond may be based upon any information which is available to the special inquiry officer, or which is
presented to him by the alien or the INS."
*67. Id.
68. AlNaijar, 97 F. Supp.2d at 1346.
69. Consideration by the Immigration Judge of an application or request of a respondent regarding
custody or bond under this section shall be separate and apart from, and shall form no part of, any
deportation or removal hearing or proceeding. The determination of the Immigration Judge as to custody
status or bond may be based upon any information that is available to the Immigration Judge or that is
presented to him or her by the alien or the Service. 8 C.F.R. § 3.19(d) (1995).
70. Najjar at 1348.
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protections." Based on the precedent established by Haitian Refugee Center
v. Smith,76 the court stated that the liberty interests of aliens are tied to the
Executive's authority under the statute or regulation at issue." Therefore, a
constitutionally protected liberty interest will not exist where the Attorney
General's discretion is "unfettered" or "an act of grace.""8 The court relied on
the Supreme Court's recognition that the Attorney General's power to detain
an alien who is neither a flight risk nor a threat to national security during
deportation proceedings is circumscribed, as evidence that the Attorney
General's authority to detain an alien during bond redetermination proceedings
is not unfettered.79 Therefore, the petitioner possessed constitutionally
protected rights to apply for the redetermination of his custody status.80
The recognition of Al Najjar's due process rights led the court to observe
that the government's arguments for the use of secret evidence arose only from
statutory law and did not consider the constitutional limits of those
regulations.8' In order to determine the extent of the process due to the
petitioner, the court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge2 test. 3 Given that the
test applies with equal force to aliens, the court proceeded to measure Al
Najjar's interest against that of the government." In addressing the
petitioner's interest, the court rejected the government's contention that Al
Najjar was not entitled to release pending deportation and that his detention
was solely a matter of the Attorney General's discretion.85 The court
emphasized that the question at issue was the constitutionality of the process,
which determined the petitioner's continued detention. 6 Also, the status of
the petitioner as a deportable alien, rather than one subject to a final order of
deportation, conferred on him greater rights than enjoyed by other aliens.8 7
Therefore, the court declared that the government's reliance on classified
information compromised the fairness of the petitioner's hearing by denying
75. Id.
76. 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
77. Najiarat 1350.
78. Id. at 1350.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1351.
81. Id. at 1352.
82. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine the level
of procedural due process required in a given situation. The court must consider: (i) the private interest that
will be affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioner's rights through the procedures used and
(3) the government's interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
83. AlNaijar, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1352.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1353.
87. There is no limit on the Attorney General's power regarding aliens subject to final orders of
deportation. Id. at 1353.
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him access to review or rebut the evidence used against him and thus
implicated core aspects of the Due Process Clause.88
Given that the fairness of the procedures used against the petitioner was
compromised, the court found that the petitioner had a strong interest in having
his requestjudged fairly so that he could return to his family and community.89
The court further stated that the failure to provide the petitioner an opportunity
to review the ex parte in camera proceedings precluded an adversarial check
on the information presented, which raised a strong possibility of erroneous
determination.9"
The court then proceeded to analyze the government's interest.9' The
court conceded that the government has a very strong interest in the efficient
administration of immigration laws and in safeguarding national security.92
However, the court also reasoned that the government has an equally strong
interest in the integrity and accuracy of administrative proceedings.93 The
court then balanced the government's interest with the petitioner's interest and
found that the petitioner's procedural due process right to a fundamental fair
hearing to determine his right to release had been violated in that he was not
given: (1) notice of the evidence presented in opposition of his release, (2) an
opportunity to confront and refute the evidence presented, and (3) a
fundamentally impartial hearing to determine the redetermination of his
custody status.94
Having established a procedural due process violation, the court concluded
that the appropriate remedy was to afford the petitioner the opportunity to have
his application judged in a fundamentally fair manner.95 In setting forth the
proper procedural requirements, the court stated that the IJ should first try to
use only the public record to determine if Al Najjar was a threat to national
security.96 Only when the public record is insufficient to conclude that the
petitioner must be detained, as a national security risk, is the government
permitted to provide classified information.97 If the presentation of secret
88. The court stated that Al Najjar had the right to: (1) petition the government and to have the
petition fairly judged, (2) notice of the grounds on which the government continues to detain and (3) the
opportunity to present evidence in opposition to the government's reasons. Id. at 1353-1354.
89. Id. at 1354.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1356.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1357.
95. The court outlined procedures it believes would constitute a fundamental fair hearing: (1) notice
of the proposed action and the grounds on which it is based, (2) the individual's right to know the evidence
presented against him, (3) a decision based solely on the evidence presented, and (4) a proceeding open to
the public. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1358.
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evidence is required, the court stated that the statutes already in existence" can
provide guidance for the IJ to establish procedures for the introduction of
classified evidence in a manner that properly balances petitioner's due process
rights and the government's interest in national security."
Finally, the court considered whether the petitioner's detention based on
his association with the PIJ violated the INA or the First Amendment.00 In the
absence of statutory authority determining the issue, the court turned to case
law that set forth the extent of "association" that must be shown to deport an
alien based on his affiliation with an organization deemed threatening to
national security.' 0 ' In Rowoldt v. Perfetto,'2 the Supreme Court found that
mere membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party was not enough
to be a cause for deportation.0 3 Rather, the association must represent a
"meaningful association" with and realization of the "distinct and active
political nature" of the organization."°  Based on the Supreme Court's
standard, the district court concluded that "mere association with a known
terrorist organization such as the PIJ does not constitute a reasonable
foundation under the INA for the conclusion that petitioner was a threat to
national security and therefore would not be released from INS custody on
bond."'0 5 Having concluded that the IJ's finding that Petitioner was a threat
to national security was unreasonable, the court found there to be no need to
address the First Amendment issues raised by petitioner. °6
CONCLUSION
On December 15, 2000, Mazan Al Najjar was released from custody after
three and half years of imprisonment.'0 7 Following the District Court's
decision, the original Immigration Judge who decided Al Najjar's case
reversed himself and also ordered Al Najjar's release. 'On remand, the IJ
98. The Classified Information and Procedure Act (CIPA), 18 USCA APP. 3 § 1, and Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which set up the Alien Terrorist Removal
Court (ATRC) both provide procedures for the use of classified information which take into account the
defendant's interests and balance them with the government's interest in safeguarding national security.
99. AlNajyar, 97 F. Supp. 2dat 1359.
100. Id. at 1360.
101. Id.
102. 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1362.
106. Id.
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found that Al Najjar had no ties to terrorism."° On appeal, a three judge panel
for the BIA affirmed the order to release Al Najjar." 0 Even Attorney General
Janet Reno, whose justice department aggressively used secret evidence,"'I
after reading both the open court and secret evidence presented, decided not
to pursue the matter further."2
At the time of Al Najjar's release there was a great deal of excitement that
his case had set a precedent and created a smoother path to challenging secret
evidence on due process grounds in the future. However, that all changed on
September 11, 2001. One of the people caught in the wide dragnet that the
Justice department and FBI launched was Al Najjar.' Almost one year after
his release in December, Al Najjar was imprisoned yet again." 4 This time he
is being held in a maximum-security prison where he is confined to his cell for
23 hours a day." 5 His visitation, telephone, reading and recreation privileges
are sharply limited."6 The irony of Al Najjar's present detention is that when
Attorney General Reno permitted his release, the government in effect
declared that he had no ties to terrorism and that he was not a flight risk,' '7 the
two reasons that non-criminal aliens can be detained."8
There had already been a developing trend to disallow the use of secret
evidence while Al Najjar was being detained.' ' However, since the events of
September 11, that effort has come to an end, replaced by far more draconian
measures such as the Patriot Act 20 and the establishment of military
tribunals.' 2 ' As James Zogby, the president of the Arab-American Institute,
has said, "they promised to do away with secret evidence and they did. The
109. Id.
II0. Id.
Ill. Robyn Blumner, Reno Was Not a Protector ofimmigrant's Basic Rights, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES





116. Michael Fechter, Al Najar Attorneys Present Judge with Freedom Plea, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE,
Thursday, Dec. 20, 2001.
117. Since, Al Najjar as a Palestinian has no country of origin, no travel documents or any country
that will take him, he is for all practical purposes incapable of leaving the United States. Lomartire, supra
note 107, at IA.
118. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 295 (1993).
119. See Secret Evidence Repeal Act of 1999, H.R. 2121, 106th Cong. (1999).
120. The US Patriot Act was passed after September I I to give the government expanded legal
powers to deal with suspected terrorists and their supporters. 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (2001).
121. The military tribunals were set up to allow the government to try, sentence and execute foreign
terrorists in secrecy with no constitutional protection or right of appeal. It could be applied to a non-citizen
who is an international terrorist or who aided and abetted or knowingly harbored a terrorist. However, it
is believed that the tribunals will only be used against foreign terrorists captured overseas. Michael Isikoff
and Stuart Taylor, Justice in the Shadows, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 2001, at 39.
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only thing is, they've replaced it with no evidence.' 22
Many critics have pointed out that the government has had effective
measures to deal with terrorism in place since 1996.123 Congress passed the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act which created
the Alien Terrorist Removal Court ("ATRC"). 124 The ATRC allows the
government to use secret evidence but requires it to adhere to a minimum level
of due process procedures. 25  For example, the ATRC requires that an
unclassified summary of the classified evidence at issue be presented to the
alien; and that the proceeding be held before a judge who will hear
constitutional claims. 126  However, as Professor Susan Akran of Boston
University points out, by using ordinary deportation proceedings instead of the
ATRC, the INS has been able to continue to use secret evidence to keep aliens
in custody.'27
While the ATRC offered hope of providing aliens with some constitutional
protections, the Patriot Act 121 completely ends any pretense of giving aliens
constitutional protections. § 441 of the Patriot Act dramatically expands the
types of activities that can be classified as terrorist acts.129 For example,
collecting money, soliciting membership for or providing material support to
an organization can constitute terrorist activities.' Support for an
organization's humanitarian aspects without any knowledge of its terrorist
links can now be construed as terrorism."'
Also, terrorist organizations are no longer limited to those listed in the
Federal Register. 3 2 Previously, the State Department undertook a very careful
analysis before a group was designated a terrorist organization because that
designation would have to survive a court challenge.'33 However, § 411 of the
Patriot Act designates "two or more individuals organized or which engage in
terrorist acts" as a terrorist organization.'3 § 411 also applies retroactively and
122. Evan Thomas and Michael Isikoff, Justice Kept in the Dark NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 37-
43.






128. 18 U.S.C. § 1231 (2001).
129. Chang, Nancy, What's So Patriotic About Trampling on the Bill of Rights, Center for




133. Benjamin Wittes, One Year Later, Key Enforcement Tools Remain Unused, LEGAL TIMES, June
2, 1997. at 1.
134. Chang, supra note 129.
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would allow the removal of any alien who collected funds or assisted an
undesignated terrorist organization.'35 Hence, this definition could apply to Al
Najjar due to his association with Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, who eventually
became the head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.'36 Both men had worked at
the World and Islamic Studies Enterprise from 1991 to 1995 when Shallah left
to take over the PIJ. 37 Previously, this association with a colleague was not
sufficient to prove a connection between Al Najjar and terrorism. 38 However,
under the Patriot Act's new definition, Al Najjar's previous association with
Shallah could be applied to him if he were tried again. 39
Al Najjar's problems are further compounded by § 412 of the Patriot Act,
which allows the Attorney General to hold an immigrant charged with an
immigration violation until he is deported or is certified a non-terrorist. 40
While the Attorney General is required to review the alien's status every six
months, the Attorney General does not have to provide the evidence to the
non-citizen or allow it to be contested at an IJ hearing. 4 ' Al Najjar's first
immigration violation could now be used instead of secret evidence to
maintain his continued detention in the future.
While Al Najjar may have won the battle against the INS and the Justice
Department over the use of secret evidence in a bond redetermination hearing,
he lost the war. September !1 unleashed a whole new arsenal of legal weapons
that the government can deploy to detain aliens in custody with tenuous or no
charges. While Al Najjar had been able to challenge the Attorney General's
level of discretion, the Patriot Act has closed this attack for the foreseeable
future. The new laws will not only affect Al Najjar but all aliens whose only
crime would have been a minor immigration violation. The irony of course is
that 15 of the 19 hijackers responsible for the destruction of the World Trade
Center had entered and were residing in America legally.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Ishaak Meeran
135. Id.
136. Lomartire, supra note 107, at IA.
137. Id.
138. Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
139. Id.
140. Chang, supra note 129.
141. Id.
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